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"This is for Life": A Discursive Analysis of the Dilemmas of 
Constructing Diagnostic Identities
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Abstract: This paper takes a discourse analytic approach to the construction of identities formed 
through reception of a psychiatric diagnosis (I will refer to these as "diagnostic identities" 
throughout) as dilemmatic, and the subsequent negotiations of identities in light of that dilemma. 
More specifically, it is the diagnosis schizophrenia that is of interest, and how people who receive 
that diagnosis construct their identities. A key feature of receiving a schizophrenic diagnosis is the 
potential to see one's identity as under threat from the many negative, and predominantly 
stereotypical ideas, that persist regarding schizophrenia. Drawing on literature emerging from the 
field of service user research in mental health, the paper attempts to go beyond the boundaries of a 
psychiatric biomedical perspective of diagnosis, in order to illuminate how such classifications 
impact upon those who receive them. In this paper the discursive re-workings of individual 
diagnostic identities included strategies of resisting diagnosis, attempts to distance oneself from 
diagnosis, existentialising diagnosis, and recognising but resisting suggestions that people with 
diagnoses of schizophrenia are a social "risk". 
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1. Introduction
This paper is concerned with analysing how people react to receiving a 
psychiatric diagnosis of schizophrenia, and construct identities in light of such a 
diagnosis. A key part of the identity of mental health service users1 can come 
through societal understandings and knowledge of their particular diagnosis (e.g. 
schizophrenia). Diagnosis is a central part of psychiatric practice as it enables a 
set of presenting experiences to be classified in a way that allows a program of 
care and treatment to be implemented. For the people who receive psychiatric 
diagnoses, the process of categorisation can become an important means 
through which they become socially visible. This process of being identified as 
someone with a psychiatric diagnosis means service users can become 
recipients of the effects of the labels they receive (BHUGRA, 2006; DAVIDSON, 
2003; DINOS, LYONS & FINLAY, 2005). As such, diagnosis can have important 
consequences for identities (SADLER, 2005). [1]
Of all the different forms of diagnosis it is the categories of schizophrenia that 
have been shown to be amongst the most challenging to service users (KNIGHT, 
WYKES & HAYWARD, 2006; PINFOLD et al., 2003; SCHULZE & 
ANGERMEYER, 2002). Media reports involving schizophrenia very often link 
people diagnosed to notions of risk and violence (HARPER, 2002)—not only risk 
in relation to potentially being a danger to themselves, but also a threat to others, 
through a suggested propensity to commit violent crime. Links between 
schizophrenic diagnosis (in the form of psychosis) and violence have been 
repeatedly reported (e.g. ANGERMEYER & SCHULZE, 2001; DAY & PAGE, 
1986; ROSE, 1998; SIEFF, 2003). This can result in those diagnosed with 
schizophrenia being perceived as posing a disproportionate risk to society 
through committing violent crime (LAURANCE, 2003). [2]
2. Identity
Analysing identity has become an important and prominent task for social 
psychology (DEAUX, 1993; TAJFEL, 1982; TERRY, HOGG & WHITE, 1999). 
Cognitive approaches have claimed that identity-formation is a reasonably stable 
process in which ascriptions are made regarding the categories within which we 
are placed. These become cognitively placed, and drivers of our post-identified 
actions. Discursive and conversational approaches have sought to elucidate the 
fluid contextual nature of identity (BROWN & LUNT, 2002; COUPLAND & 
GWYN, 2003; HORTON-SALWAY, 2001). Far from perceiving identity as a 
stable cognitive entity, discursive models have considered identity as produced 
through interactional "work". The everyday business of discursively producing 
knowledge is the practice of "doing" identity work. As with other psychological 
phenomena, identity is taken as an achievement, produced through discursive 
(inter)action. Multiple identities can be produced according to the social contexts 
in which we operate at any given time. An identity worked up in one context (e.g. 
1 The people studied in this paper will be referred to as "service users" (a shortened version of 
mental health service users). This term is used rather than more medicalised labels such as 
"schizophrenics", "patients", "mentally ill" people.
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as a teacher) could be markedly different to that formed in alternate contexts 
(e.g. as a disgruntled shopper). Accordingly, identities are not fixed but are 
transient, malleable products of our lexical economies. [3]
An issue with psychiatric diagnoses is the potential pervasive nature of their 
power to form identities that exist across multiple contexts. Whilst identities can 
be transient and multiple, differing according to context, diagnostic identities can 
have the power to be the dominant identifying feature in multiple contexts, and 
become the prime identifying feature (KNIGHT et al., 2006; PINFOLD et al., 
2003; SCHULZE & ANGERMEYER, 2002). This makes it important to address 
the effects of diagnosis on service user identity. [4]
Adopting an action-oriented approach to the diagnostic identities of service users 
involves identifying the discursive features of narratives utilised to negotiate 
entering diagnostic categories. Harvey SACKS' (1995) work on the negotiation of 
category membership in discursive interactions proves valuable here. Particularly 
the concept of "category entitlements" in analysing how service users discursively 
relate to the diagnostic categories placed upon them. Given that issues facing 
service users are already bound up in being a member of a category, it is not how 
they create categories per se that is of analytic interest, but how they re-work 
those categories. With category entitlement SACKS attended to the different 
ways that narrative "rights" work for each member of the interaction. His now 
well-known example was the interaction between a witness to an accident and a 
friend, in which the friend did not have equal "rights" to express the same feelings 
of distress regarding the accident, as the friend had not actually witnessed it. This 
shares the concerns of service user research (this will be discussed in greater 
detail later in the paper), in terms of emphasising the need to address people's 
own perspectives of their experiences, as opposed to, for instance, addressing 
the issue and possible effects of diagnosis solely from the perspective of mental 
health professionals. [5]
This raises questions such as "what does it mean to enter a diagnostic category 
of schizophrenia, and how are such categories taken on and re-worked through 
the localised concerns of individual service users?" In mental health research the 
use of category entitlements has been demonstrated to be useful in analysing the 
meaning associated with aggression in psychiatric wards (BENSON et al., 2003). 
Discursive approaches have additionally addressed a wider set of issues in 
mental health research. For instance, professional accounts of the use of 
electroconvulsive therapy (STEVENS & HARPER, 2007); narratives of recovery 
from severe mental distress (MANCINI & ROGERS, 2007); men's experiences of 
depression (GALASINSKI, 2008); and analysing the role of interpersonal 
psychotherapy in recovery from depression (CROWE & LUTY, 2005). Discursive 
research has also focused on analysing important mediums for the construction 
and representation of mental health knowledge and understanding, for example, 
discourse analysis of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (CROWE, 2001), and 
reporting of mental health issues in the print media (HAZLETON, 1997). An aim 
of this paper is to further develop discursive approaches in mental health through 
focusing on diagnosis and identity from the perspective of service users. [6]
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3. Interactive Kinds
Diagnosis is primarily a practice done to people, in a top-down sense. Knowledge 
of how practices of diagnosis operate in a top-down way is important, and BOYLE 
(2002), and BENTALL (2003) amongst others, have demonstrated the fragility of 
certain diagnostic categories in terms of their scientific validity and reliability. 
These critiques have questioned the very heart of psychiatric practice, namely 
diagnostic categories as the primary mechanism through which psychiatric 
knowledge is practiced. This critical work is valuable, but insight can also be 
gained regarding how diagnostic categorisation works through analysing the 
ways that service users "own" categories. For instance, how they relate and 
discursively account for their experiences in light of diagnostic categories, and 
attempt to overcome the challenges of being obliged to discuss one's identity in 
relation to diagnostic knowledge. Through focusing directly on the accounts of 
service users themselves, analysis can highlight the ways that becoming and 
recognising oneself as identifiable through a diagnosis of schizophrenia can 
impact upon everyday life. [7]
The impact of awareness of social positioning can be significant. Feelings and 
actions are constituted, in part at least, by recognition of how we are socially 
classified. We are constantly being made (and remade) through "feedback loops" 
(HACKING, 1999), which are processes of being classified, and then recognising 
our classifications. People act differently in recognition of the way/s they are 
classified, which involves not only a base awareness, but also one built through 
interacting with the world in a particular way because of classification. Indeed, 
HACKING's concept could be seen as a move on from traditional "labelling 
theory" that pointed to the effects of the labels placed upon us for identity. Classic 
studies in that field have suggested labelling can be a positive factor in terms of 
providing an "explanation" for severe mental distress, but can additionally be a 
significant negative influence on identity due to post-labelling influence of 
discrimination (THOITS, 1999; LINK & PHELAN, 1999). A notion of interactive 
kinds not only incorporates the effects of classification on those classified, but 
additionally provides a theoretical route on post-classification interaction between 
social knowledge and individual behaviour. [8]
In exemplifying this HACKING utilises BOYLE's (2002) argument that the 
diagnosis schizophrenia fundamentally lacks scientific reliability and validity, and 
as such the diagnosis should be understood as a "social construct", rather than a 
label for a clearly defined mental illness. Whereas mainstream psychiatry's 
diagnostic model posits the diagnosis of schizophrenia as a scientific entity, which 
defines an underlying mental disorder, HACKING suggests it is actually an 
"interactive kind", namely a classification that is organised through the ways that 
people interact with it post-awareness of their classification. HACKING uses the 
historical changes in the diagnosis schizophrenia to exemplify this, namely how 
hallucinations became a "first rank symptom" in Kurt SCHNEIDER's classification 
of psychiatric disorders due to their absence in the earlier (and foundational) 
model of Eugen BLEULER, in which hallucinations were not a prime symptom. 
For HACKING one effect of the absence in BLEULER's model was that people 
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were not wary of displaying hallucinatory behaviour, as it would not result in being 
labelled as schizophrenic. In turn, this overtness of hallucinatory behaviour 
subsequently "fed back" into future classifications of schizophrenia (e.g. Kurt 
SCHNEIDER's). HACKING argues the term "schizophrenia" is not solely defining 
an underlying illness, but is organised according to the relation between social 
knowledge and feedback of people's actions (as influenced through their 
awareness of being classified) post-classification. The diagnostic category has 
been moulded through the interaction of altered actions of people classified 
through awareness of their diagnosis. [9]
A strength of HACKING's concept is that it enables theory to consider the relation 
between social knowledge and its impact upon people and the localised re-
working of knowledge in people's everyday lives. We become aware of the 
classifications placed upon us (e.g. as parent, sibling, academic) and this impacts 
upon our subsequent behaviour. Altered post-classification knowledge 
subsequently feeds back into future knowledge. In mental health this nicely 
frames the endeavours of "service user research" (COFFEY, 2006; GODFREY & 
WISTOW, 1997; NEWNES, HOLMES & DUNN, 1999, 2001; PINFOLD, 2000; 
POWELL, SINGLE & LLOYD, 1996; SALVI, JONES & RUGGERI, 2005; 
TRIVEDI & WYKES, 2002), which, although varied, share a desire to identify the 
effects on people of becoming and being a service user, with emphasis on their own 
perspective. Whilst knowledge about service users (e.g. diagnostic knowledge) is 
available, what cannot be known are the multifarious localised re-workings of 
such knowledge by service users, unless their perspective is gained. [10]
Service user research has emerged from a desire for, and recognition of, the 
value of incorporating the experiences of people who use psychiatric services in 
research around mental health. As we have seen, mental health knowledge is 
predominantly organised through mainstream psychiatry, and its diagnostic-
biomedical approach of viewing mental health difficulties as "illnesses". In this 
sense, service users' experiences are primarily understood through psychiatric 
theory and practice (i.e. the practice of diagnosis). Diagnostic classifications work 
to categorise people's experiences, reifying them as diseases and illnesses, as 
things that can be identified, singled out, and treated. Critiques of this position 
have been long known (BOYLE, 2002; COPPOCK & HOPTON, 2000; 
GOFFMAN, 1968; LAING, 1969; PARKER, GEORGACA, HARPER, 
McLAUGHLIN & STOWELL-SMITH, 1995; SZASZ, 1974) and although varied, 
have placed great emphasis on de-medicalising service users' experiences. They 
have argued such experiences are not purely symptoms of illness, but real-life 
experience, grounded in everyday life concerns that need to be listened to, 
addressed, and fed into mental health research. [11]
Consequently it is important to analyse how service users themselves relate to 
potentially challenging diagnostic identities. Undertaking this approach will 
facilitate a greater insight into how service users view, perceive, manage and feel 
about their diagnoses. This will help illuminate the ways that service users 
construct identities in light of the multiple forms of knowledge that are culturally 
available to draw upon. Given the previously mentioned negative connotations 
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that can be associated with these forms of knowledge, service users face 
particular challenges in relation to identity. Additionally, given the current debates 
regarding the role of diagnosis in mental health (see BOYLE, 2007; CAMPBELL, 
2007; CROMBY, HARPER & REAVEY, 2007), it is important a service user 
perspective continues to be investigated. [12]
This paper aims to consider the ways that knowledge of the diagnosis 
schizophrenia is taken on and re-worked in the localised discursive workings of 
service users. In doing so it aims to contribute to service user research through 
analysis of service users' own versions of diagnosis, in which they are obliged to 
"enter" such classifications when discussing the diagnostic categories within 
which they have been placed. Understanding of future knowledge of 
schizophrenia requires addressing how people who receive that diagnosis react 
to it, which form ongoing "feedback loops" through which future incarnations of 
the category are produced. This is particularly important for schizophrenia given 
its contentious nature (BOYLE, 2002). [13]
4. Method
The methodological approach in this paper appreciates the arguments made by 
WETHERELL (1998) that discourse analysis can benefit from drawing on 
concepts from both discursive psychology and Foucauldian discourse analytic 
traditions. [14]
In terms of discursive psychology (EDWARDS, 1997; EDWARDS & POTTER, 
1992; POTTER, 1996), it is the focus on the localised micro interactional use of 
language that is of interest. An example would be to analyse the ways that the 
notion of "implausibility" is constructed by mental health professionals when 
discussing how certain experiences are categorised as "delusional" 
(GEORGACA, 1996). In this area, "implausibility" could be used in multiple ways 
in managing the "stake and accountability" (POTTER, 1996) of the individual. 
One may want to justify the administration of diagnosis of delusion, and thus 
provide professional justification for one's decisions. Here, "implausibility" is not 
conceptualised as a distinct cognitive entity, a feature of somebody's mental 
attributions, but rather as a rhetorical "tool" used as part of the production of a 
particular version of events. [15]
Foucauldian discourse analysis (FDA) on the other hand approaches the role of 
discursive practices in the operation and production of knowledge from a different 
level than discursive psychology (see WILLIG, 2001, for a broader description). 
Rather than look no further than the use of categories and concepts in 
interactions, FDA draws attention to the role of societal-level discursive 
formations (or discourses). A feature of this is the assumption that people draw 
upon particular discourses in context-dependent ways. In doing so they position 
themselves, and are positioned, by discourses, with the view that such positioning 
exposes them to societal knowledge associated to the position they occupy (see 
HARRÉ [1998] for broader explication of positioning theory). For instance, people 
who receive a diagnosis of schizophrenia are exposed to societal knowledge 
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regarding that classification, and subject to institutional practices associated with 
it, namely, psychiatric services, and the illness/medical model they mostly work 
within. [16]
WETHERELL's (1998) approach has become popular in the area of discourse 
analysis (e.g. LaFRANCE, 2007; STEVENS & HARPER, 2007), and this kind of 
approach is valuable in terms of the analytic aims of this paper. For instance, 
there is a need to address the positioning practices at work in interactions with 
service users. Additionally, these need to be analysed in terms of how they 
operate, impact upon, and are taken on and re-worked at a localised everyday 
level. This approach enables analysis of how discourses position people, but are 
additionally used and re-framed through localised discursive interactions. [17]
4.1 Participants
Thirty-eight participants were interviewed for this project, with fifteen female and 
twenty-three males, all over eighteen years of age. Recruitment occurred through 
a variety of voluntary and charity-run day centres (non-NHS2) across the East 
Midlands in the UK. I, as the interviewer, was introduced by centre staff prior to 
making myself available to speak to service users, and subsequently arranging 
suitable interview times for those interested in taking part. A purposive sampling 
strategy was utilised in that service users approached had all received a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia, were in contact with local community psychiatric 
services (not in-patient) and consequently were receiving treatment. Thus, 
participants were recognised by services and themselves as "service users". It 
should be noted that since the move from in-patient hospital care as the primary 
means of treating service users to "care in the community" in the UK, most 
service users (unless in states of acute illness) will have the opportunity to access 
day centres such as those approached for this study. A large proportion of day 
centres are provided by the voluntary and charity sectors. As such, the 
participants interviewed in this study are broadly typical of service users across the 
UK. Ethical approval was gained from the university I was based at the time, and 
all service users gave written informed consent to take part in the research. [18]
4.2 Interviews
Undertaking an interview approach means accounting for the role of the context 
of the interview itself. In being interviewed, the participants are placed in a space 
that requires them to provide an account of their experiences, but one that 
addresses the interviewer, as well as their everyday lives. Arguments have been 
made that interviews are overused in discursive work (POTTER & HEPBURN, 
2005), in that interviews produce a certain kind of interaction that is not 
appropriate for all kinds of discursive analysis (e.g. where accounts of "naturally 
occurring" talk are taken as more appropriate). Despite these concerns, 
interviews, and the context they provide, are considered beneficial for the aims of 
this study, as they provide service users an opportunity to discuss their 
2 NHS refers to the Government-funded National Health Service in the United Kingdom. The day 
centres visited in this study were not part of the NHS, but were charity funded and managed centres. 
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experiences, in a flexible space, with a concern to allow any variability and 
complexity to emerge. Alternative methods could also have facilitated this (e.g. 
focus groups), but interviews were used so as to provide a safe confidential 
space for users. [19]
4.3 Interview technique
In-depth semi-structured interviews were used, which allowed the participants to 
elaborate and introduce new aspects of experience, whilst still covering a set 
number of key areas. These were around forty-five minutes in length, and 
focused on receiving a diagnosis, understanding of diagnostic terms, and overall 
feelings in regard to diagnosis. The use of semi-structured interviews offered a 
flexible interview space, within which service users could discuss other aspects of 
their lives, and potentially open up new avenues, other than those directly 
addressed by the interview schedule itself. Interviews were then transcribed using 
a technique based upon that designed by JEFFERSON (1985), but to a less 
detailed degree (e.g. POTTER & WETHERELL, 1987). This can be seen in the 
Appendix. [20]
4.4 Analytic coding
Analysis began with repeated reading and re-reading of transcripts. This is the 
common procedure for developing in-depth familiarity with transcripts in discourse 
analysis (GILL, 1996). After this the coding process began, which involved 
identifying all parts of the transcripts that referred to the service users' own 
diagnostic history. This approach was utilised so as to include all sections of 
transcripts that referred to the diagnostic categorisation or classification of mental 
health difficulties by psychiatric services. Coding was conducted in a very 
inclusive manner, so as to include all references to diagnosis, and the process of 
categorising mental distress, even those that do not explicitly mention health 
difficulties. Following WOOD and KROGER's (2000) guidelines analytic 
categories were developed through noting of repeated and interesting features of 
the transcripts. Once categories for coding had been completed they were cut 
and pasted into separate documents, and these formed the basis for analysis. 
The interpretative phase of analysis that followed focused on identifying wider 
discursive formations of positioning drawn upon (DAVIES & HARRÉ, 2001), as 
well as notions of stake, accountability and blame (POTTER, 1996), in 
participants' accounts of receiving and living with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. 
This followed WETHERELL's (1998) approach of utilising aspects of both FDA 
and discursive psychology. [21]
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5. Results
The interviews demonstrated discursive strategies for managing the risk to 
identity that can exist through reception of a diagnosis of schizophrenia. A 
dilemma of seeking to account for distressing events in one's life whilst 
recognising that a psychiatric explanation brings with it identity-threatening 
connotations was central to the accounts provided. Additionally, notions of 
causality were introduced that allowed a partial protection against the negative 
impact of diagnosis, through discussing the onset of illness as due to genetic 
factors. In the second half of the analysis the idea of being a risk to others 
(through propensity to commit violent crime) featured as a concern. Strategies of 
dealing with this included constructing a sense of agency over personal action, 
and using a subtle distinction between aggression and risk to position oneself 
away from being seen as a threat to others. Given the limitations of space the 
analysis will feature only three service users from the total corpus of data. These 
three are exemplars of key issues found throughout the data set. [22]
Analysis took two main thematic directions, firstly, addressing the construction of 
diagnostic identities as dilemmatic, secondly the negotiating of identity in light of 
the dilemma. This will involve identifying the discursive resources drawn upon and 
developed when producing identities that are potentially "risky". Potentially being 
labelled with a "schizophrenic identity" involves facing the forms of social 
knowledge that exist about that diagnosis (e.g. positioning people with that 
diagnosis as "risky" to others). The extracts presented provide examples of some 
of the discursive strategies utilised in producing diagnostic identities as 
dilemmatic. This is not to suggest that all service users would experience the 
same challenges, but that the data shown highlight key challenges service users 
can face in relation to diagnosis. [23]
5.1 The problem of acceptance: Long term identities
The following section focuses on the problems involved in accounting for mental 
health difficulties after recognition that a diagnosis has been received, firstly, by ex-
ploring strategies of accepting diagnosis, then through focusing on the challenges 
of acceptance of a diagnostic identity over the long term. In doing so, the focus is 
on the process of needing to accept (or not) an identity that can have pervasive 
effects on everyday living, through being long-term and bringing with it potential 
exposure to negative implications associated with the diagnosis schizophrenia. In 
the following extract Ben3, who was in his early twenties at time of interview, 
discusses the situation of receiving a diagnosis around four years previously:
Extract 1 
Ian: mm (2) what about your diagnosis then? Have you always agreed with it?
Ben: well I always knew there was something wrong cos you don't hear voices for (.) 
no apparent reason (I: mm) (3) and I kept, when wh..wh..when they didn't diagnose 
me at first (.) I kept saying you know (.) I know there's something wrong (I: mm) (1) 
3 All names are pseudonyms.
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and then when it was, the diagnosis was given (.) to me it was like (1) finally some 
closure (.) you know what I mean I..I..I have got something wrong (I: mm) (1) but then 
I (.) on the other hand it was like schizophrenia (.) I've got to live with that for the rest 
of my life (I: mm) (1) so it was kind of mixed emotions ... [lines 342-349] [24]
Ben reports his diagnosis of schizophrenia coming after a period in which he 
claims he knew something was wrong. His diagnostic identity is presented as 
something he had a controlling stake in acquiring, through identifying his 
experiences as problematic, which positions them as something requiring an 
explanation. He states his concern at the time that he was not provided with a 
diagnosis immediately, and was subsequently very relieved when a diagnosis 
was given. In doing this he actively positions himself as a service user through 
stating his desire and drive to receive a diagnosis ("I kept saying you know [.] I 
know there's something wrong"). The notion of control over diagnosis is worked 
up through the use of an extreme case formulation (EDWARDS & POTTER, 
1992), namely "I always knew". A sense of agency is formed through a 
construction of persistence ("I kept"), with the repetition of "I kept" a repair to 
contrast with "they". Diagnosis is not reported as being involuntarily given to him, 
but something he actively sought. Diagnosis becomes a welcome explanatory 
tool in terms of Ben's previous problematic experiences of mental distress. 
People with health problems can often welcome a diagnosis, particularly if it 
means they can be effectively treated, as it can provide an explanation for what 
may well have been a difficult experience (TUCKER, 2004). However, this is 
constructed as dilemmatic for Ben, as it can result in a long-lasting identity with 
negative connotations. The formation of diagnosis worked up means his past 
experiences are re-categorised in a potentially challenging way, namely an 
identity that Ben potentially has to live with permanently ("it was schizophrenia, 
I've got to live with that for the rest of my life"). This claim uses an extreme case 
formulation' ("the rest of my life"), demonstrating the pressures on identity that he 
faces. He was relieved to receive an explanation for the distressing behaviour ("I 
knew there was something wrong"), but it came at a cost, namely membership of 
a challenging category. A strategy aimed at attempting to overcome this dilemma 
can be seen in the next section of Ben's extract:
Extract 2 
Ben: yeah, that's the way I look upon it cos it's not getting any better 
Ian: but is that  
Ben: it's not getting any easier
Ian: mm (1) have you been told that have you or?
Ben: I haven't been told that no I just, my mum's got it, my my real mum, biological 
mum (I: mm) she's got it (.) she's got schizophrenia, and my uncle has (I: mm) (.) and 
my biological dad had a personality disorder (I: mm) so (1) there was an increased 
chance that (I: mm) (.) I'd get it but (.) only by a little (.) so 
Ian: mm (3) so do you think there's sort of a (.) gene.. genetic element to it then?
Ben: yeah (I: mm) (1) yeah definitely (1) sometimes when I'm off on one and I (.) can't 
come back (1) er (.) come back to (.) society (2) I'll always say, Frances, that's my 
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real mum, shouldn't have had kids (I: mm) (1) cos I'm not going to have kids (.) cos I 
wouldn't like to pass it on (I: mm) so (1) and e..e...er that's just a decision I've made 
(.) (I: so you..) I wouldn't like, I wouldn't like to wish this on anyone you know what I 
mean (I: mm) ... [lines 404-420] [25]
Ben's "answer" to the aforementioned dilemma is to produce a category of his 
own based upon both psychiatric knowledge and personal experience. He draws 
on psychiatric knowledge in terms of framing an increased chance receiving a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia, through construction of genetic formulation of 
increased risk due to his mother's mental health status. This turn is a key one. By 
introducing a family history through a genetic descriptor, a form of biological 
determinism is alluded to. Ben produces a personal identity that has occurred due 
to his genes. This works to counter a possible alternative explanation of his 
mental health difficulties resulting from some form of psychological problem with 
Ben. This formulation draws on classic mind-body dualistic thought regarding 
bodies as distinct biological entities, formed, in part at least, by genetics, whose 
existence and operation are largely outside of personal control. In the extract this 
version of causality works to limit personal responsibility presently, and, more 
importantly, over the initial onset of mental distress. [26]
Ben faces the problem of accounting for his difficult behaviour and experiences. 
He talks about when he "goes off on one", and "can't come back". He presents 
such events in quite a vague manner, but nevertheless as requiring some kind of 
explanation. Not only the difficulty of "going off on one", but also the lack of 
control he appears to have over such instances ("can't come back"). By stating 
that "he always knew" something was wrong "in the first place", Ben constructs a 
level of expertise over the claims that follow. This is a form of "category 
entitlement" (SACKS, 1995; EDWARDS & POTTER, 1992), in that the expertise 
he introduces entitles him to make the subsequent claim, and presents Ben as in 
a position of control regarding his own mental health difficulties. His genetic 
explanation, which whilst not ideal, at least can be located as part of Ben's 
identity that he has no initial control over, in the same way as the colour of his 
hair or sex for example. Towards the end of the extract Ben's position regarding 
control moves from being externally represented to something he claims back for 
himself. He regains authority over his life through positioning himself as choosing 
not to have children, enabling control over genetics to be taken. It may be the 
case that he has limited control over onset of his mental health difficulties, but he 
can take responsibility over whether he passes any genetic potential on to 
anyone else (i.e. children). This again points to the dilemmatic nature of identity 
for Ben, to retain a sense of agency requires very difficult and potential 
negativising decisions to be made (i.e. not having children). [27]
5.2 Attending to notions of risk
This section will explore how forms of social knowledge can operate as threats to 
identity, primarily through association with potential risk. Reports in the media of 
people diagnosed with schizophrenia committing violent crimes form a high 
proportion of total media coverage of the diagnosis (PHILO, 1996), which can 
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result in cultural (mis) understandings that people diagnosed schizophrenic pose 
a significant threat to the general public. This issue can be seen in the following 
extract with a male service user Mark, who was in his mid-thirties, and had 
received a diagnosis around ten years ago: 
Extract 3 
Ian: what about what about um (.) your diagnosis has (1) have you always been 
happy with the diagnosis, has it changed at all or ...?
Mark: cos I mean I read up on it and I (1) I know bits about it and schizophrenic (1) I 
mean (1) what I've been told about it I'm just saying (1) if you have a person who's 
schizophrenic (.) you can even sink lower or (.) or be (I: mm) (1) you can be (1) gentle 
or more aggressive (I: mm) (1) I mean (.) that's all I know (1) I mean I'm not I'm not 
aggressive to no one (I: mm) (1) I mean I might get mad but I wouldn't lash out (I: 
mm) I mean cos it's not in my nature ... [lines 127-135] [28]
Here Mark produces his own tailored definition of what a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia means. In a similar vein to that of Ben seen earlier, Mark's account 
firstly works to frame him as someone with authority (and entitlement) to talk 
about his diagnosis ("cos I mean I read up on it"). The use of "aggression" serves 
a specific function here. It is noteworthy as to present it as a potential factor in 
talking about his diagnosis of schizophrenia Mark is possibly creating a problem 
for himself. To associate a diagnosis of schizophrenia with aggression is to link 
himself to the notion. The presentation of aggression is lessened somewhat 
through inclusion of gentleness ("you can be [1] gentle or more aggressive"). 
Mark's use of aggression works to relate to, but be distinct from, the notion of 
risk, which is clearly the main problematic for Mark in positioning himself as 
having received such a diagnosis. Aggression, whilst having the potential to 
adversely affect identity, does not necessarily have the same direct impact of 
admitting one is a risk to others. One can be aggressive, but not towards other 
people. In Mark's account, he recognises the "risky" nature of his diagnosis, but 
constructs it in such a way so as to allow recognition, but additionally attempting 
to minimise adverse impact on identity. [29]
Mark works to construct a set of categories that firstly works to position him as 
self-learnt. His statement that he "read up on it" relays a process of drawing on 
expert opinion and knowledge. This is important to defend against any accusation 
that his account is produced through self-interest to protect his "stake" 
(EDWARDS & POTTER [1992] call this the "dilemma of stake"). Mark can resist 
accusations that his account is based on personal opinion, through including link 
to credible external sources. Additionally this works to "corroborate" (POTTER, 
1996) his version, not because some external person was in agreement, but due 
to Mark's version being grounded in literature. [30]
The association between diagnosis and risk featured in other users' accounts. 
Consider the following extract with Beatrice, who was in her early forties, and had 
received a diagnosis around ten years ago. 
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Extract 4 
Ian: mm (1) have you then (.) I mean do you agree then with your diagnosis? (1)
Beatrice: I do (.) especially when I get paranoid (.) it's awful (I: mm) (2) you think 
everything's against you and (1) it's awful being paranoid (I: mm) (.) I'm quite shocked 
that I am a paranoid schizophrenic because (.) you hear in (.) you hear about these 
paranoid schiz.., well (.) schizophrenics (.) committing murder (I: mm) don't you (.) in 
the news (.) so I was quite shocked to learn that I had the (.) the the the (.) disease 
really
Ian: mm (1) have you always seen it as a disease then?
Beatrice: I think so yeah I think it is (I: uh mm) (1) yeah (1) the..the (.) there's been a 
couple of times (.) the first time I was ill (.) I wanted to (.) well I I felt like (.) hurting 
some..well killing someone (1) there was a child (.) a little child at (.) at the newsagent 
just by the door and I felt like going over and (.) hurting them but I didn't (.) (I: mm) I 
stopped myself I says no I can't do that I mustn't do that it's wrong (.) and then this 
time round when I became ill I was in the bus (.) I was (.) waiting for a bus (.) I was in 
the bus queue (.) and there was this old man in front of me (.) and I thought that in 
my mind (.) my mind was showing me to put my hands around his neck like that (I: 
mm) (.) and strangle him (.) and again I had to force myself (.) it was (.) it was a really 
strong feeling you know (I: mm) I had to force myself not to (.) not to do it (I: mm) (1) 
but I've (.) that was when (.) I was still under the effects of the side effects (I: mm) (1) 
of this drug (1) but once I took the Procyclidine4 I..I didn't feel that way anymore (I: 
mm) (.) I told my psychiatrist about it and he says "you know what will happen to you 
if you did that don't you?", and I says "yeah I'd go to prison" (I: mm) (1) and he says 
yes you would (.) and we wouldn't be able to help once you (.) that happens ... [lines 
176–201] [31]
Beatrice states that she agrees with her diagnosis (paranoid schizophrenia) as 
she has experienced periods of paranoia. She narrates an account in which she 
positions herself firmly as a paranoid schizophrenic, although this is not 
immediately comfortable ("I was quite shocked"), another example of dilemmatic 
nature of diagnostic identity. The introduction of the diagnostic term "paranoid 
schizophrenic" backs her into a discursive corner, negating any avoidance of the 
diagnostic identity. Her shock and discomfort is related to an association of 
paranoid schizophrenic with murder ("you hear about the paranoid schizophrenics 
committing murder"). The classification is then framed as risk, through positioning 
in a category that is associated with a possibility to commit violent crime. 
Interestingly, Beatrice does not seek to position herself away from this 
understanding as Mark did, but narrates an account in which she could be 
assessed to be a risk herself. This may be because she did not feel able to move 
away from the category completely given the firmness of its initial introduction as 
a defining term for her mental health difficulties. [32]
What is interesting is how Beatrice negotiates this dilemma. Firstly, she works to 
produce a factual description of the diagnosis "paranoid schizophrenia". Beatrice 
introduces this through the rather general claim that "you hear about these", 
4 Procyclidine is a commonly used medication for the treatment of unwanted effects ("side 
effects") of anti-psychotic medication. 
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which itself proves inadequate in terms of factual credibility. This is followed by 
the much stronger "in the news", which draws on understanding of (perceived) 
impartial reporting of news services about factual instances. The pathological 
nature of the paranoid category is activated through the association of potential 
severe criminal activity (i.e. committing murder), and the representation of the 
category as a "disease". Beatrice's experiences are framed within an objective 
account of a disease process at work, with an associated severely problematic 
identity, that of potential murderer. This is further concretised through narrating 
an instance in which Beatrice felt the urge to cause physical harm to someone 
else. Indeed, the severity of this is emphasised as it involved two vulnerable 
groups in society, namely children and the elderly. [33]
Beatrice's way of managing this problematic identity is to narrate an account of 
personal agency. Firstly she apportions blame for the potential to commit murder 
to the disease process, which is something outside of her control. As the 
narrative develops however, she makes the move of accounting for her agency in 
terms of overcoming the dangerous urges emanating from the underlying 
disease. In making this somewhat contradictory move, Beatrice is able to produce 
a two-pronged defence against the stigmatised identity of being a potential risk to 
others. [34]
Recognition of the moral and ethical failings of the dangerous acts works to shore 
up the claims that Beatrice overcame the forces of potential risk that originate in 
the illness, rather than herself. This move is continued through apportioning 
blame for such urges as additionally constituted by the medication she was taking 
at the time. Illness and medication are documented as the root causes of risk, 
both whose causality can be positioned as factors that protect Beatrice's identity 
to an extent that is perhaps the best she could enact once positioned as a 
"paranoid schizophrenic". [35]
6. Discussion
This paper has developed understanding of three service users' constructions of 
identity in lives in relation to the operation of diagnosis, and the strategies they 
produced to discursively manage their experiences in these terms. Through 
analysis an understanding of the kinds of classificatory knowledge produced was 
developed, which informed as to the complex issues facing them in making sense 
of their experiences in relation to the diagnoses they receive. Considering the 
threats to the identities of those given psychiatric diagnoses, a broad armoury of 
discursive tools was necessary to maintain identities that work to guard against 
forms of discrimination, and negative societal perceptions. [36]
The analysis demonstrated problems that existed for Ben, Mark and Beatrice 
when classifying their mental health difficulties on several levels. Firstly they are 
faced with naming something that is a major factor in their lives, but this 
classification comes at a price. If they classify their difficulties according to 
psychiatric definitions, this can subject them to negative connotations. This is 
particularly salient in the cases of paranoid schizophrenia and the associated 
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perception of risk. However, what would it mean to not classify in this way, or to 
move away from such classifications? This depends on a secondary factor, 
namely the way that causation is constructed by users. Ben presented his mental 
health difficulties as being caused by a physical problem, namely genetic 
predisposition. This serves to construct his own illness as due to a physical 
problem with his body, rather than some kind of unspecified mental "abnormality". 
This version of causation maintains that mental health difficulties are 
physiologically, rather than psychologically, based. Thus, although an initial 
exposure to potential negative perceptions is risked, Ben's account actually 
functions to move away from such a position, through a reductive move to neuro-
chemical activity. [37]
What emerges from these analyses are the intricacies and subtleties employed 
by three service users in the discursive production of classification categories. 
They are faced with the challenges of becoming members of diagnostic 
categories that expose them to a range of potential threats to identity. In this 
paper, discursive strategies have been employed by Ben, Mark and Beatrice to 
reconstruct categories in ways that aim to limit exposure to threats to identity that 
can exist through receiving a diagnosis of schizophrenia, namely, genetic causal 
accounts, and constructing a notion of control over actions post diagnosis, which 
formulates a perception that personal agency exists in relation to committing 
actions that could be a risk to others. Although this paper included analysis from 
only three interviews, these are examples of issues that featured across the wider 
corpus of data collected for the project for which they were interviewed. [38]
7. Implications
The analysis in this paper further evidences the value and utility of undertaking 
service user research, namely, that service users, and their perspectives, provide 
a vital part of empirical efforts to build knowledge of mental health. Additionally, 
findings demonstrate that diagnostic categories, in this case schizophrenia, 
continue to present many challenges and threats to the creation and maintenance 
of a positive identity. Examples were seen of some of the difficulties in presenting 
oneself as a service user with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Crucially, this 
involved seeing diagnosis as positive in terms of providing an explanation of 
distressing mental health difficulties. But recognising that with the initial relief of 
diagnosis came a subject position exposed to negative factors (e.g. "diagnosis for 
life", and connotations of risk). Whilst these may not exist for all service users 
with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, the analysis in this paper highlights a set of 
challenges to identity that service users can become exposed to. Diagnosis is not 
seen as a straightforward either-or model of bad or good, or right or wrong. Ben, 
for instance, formulated the reception of his diagnosis as both good and bad. 
Efforts to rework diagnostic categories in light of individual concerns suggest that 
the administration and reception of a diagnostic identity is not straightforward. 
This could be because categories, as they currently exist, provide insufficient 
explanatory power for service users. Or, it could be that societal knowledge, 
produced in part by media reports, are somewhat off the mark in constructing 
sensationalist, and consequently very unhelpful portrayals for the general public 
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to digest. Or it could be that service users are not provided with enough 
information, or simply, do not understand what categories mean, beyond some 
"headline understanding" garnered from lay public arena. Looking forward, 
whatever combination of factors is key, close consideration of the impact of the 
process of diagnosis on service users is needed. And more broadly, further work 
is required to increase public awareness and understanding of mental health 
issues, which is currently overly informed by media reports that disproportionately 
produce negative, violence related, coverage of schizophrenia. [39]
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Appendix: Transcript Notation
(.) short pause, less than one second; numbers used in brackets to indicate 
number of seconds of pause
[] square brackets used for brief comments by other person
_ underlining refers to emphasis
F capitals with underlining to indicate severe emphasis
"" quote marks used when speaker drawing on third party talk
() used when that section of talk was not entirely clear; inaudible sections 
marked by stating inaudible in brackets
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